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THE MARKET EVOLUTION 
AND SALES TAKE-OFF OF PRODUCT INNOVATIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
   
In contrast to the prevailing supply-side explanation that price decreases are the key 
driver of a sales take-off, we argue that outward shifting supply and demand curves lead to 
market take-off.  Our fundamental idea is that sales in new markets are initially low since the 
first commercialized forms of new innovations are primitive. Then, as new firms enter, actual 
and perceived product quality improves (and prices possibly drop) which leads to a take-off in 
sales. To provide empirical evidence for this explanation, we explore the relationship between 
take-off times, price decreases, and firm entry for a sample of consumer and industrial product 
innovations commercialized in the US over the past 150 years.  Based on a proportional 
hazards analysis of take-off times, we find that new firm entry dominates other factors in 
explaining observed sales take-off times.  We also find no evidence that price mediates the 
relationship between firm entry and take-off time.  We interpret these results as supporting the 
idea that demand shifts during the early evolution of a new market due to non-price factors is 
the key driver of a sales take-off. 
   
   1
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The early market evolution of successful consumer and industrial product innovations is 
generally characterized by an initial period of slow growth immediately after commercialization 
that is eventually followed by a sharp increase (e.g., Mahajan, Muller, Bass 1990; Rogers 1995; 
Golder and Tellis 1997; Klepper 1997).  For most new products, the “take-off” point is clear 
since it corresponds to the first large increase in sales.  The “hockey-stick” pattern of sales 
growth also seems to be popular among industry pundits as it is commonly used to depict the 
sales of really new technological products (e.g., Moore 1991).  See the examples in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1:  The Sales Take-Off of Product Innovations 
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The time to sales take-off can vary considerably across product innovations; some quickly 
achieve sales take-off after commercialization, whereas others languish for years with low sales 
(e.g., Mahajan, Muller, and Bass 1990; Golder and Tellis 1997).  Understanding the timing and 
causes of sales take-off is critically important for industry analysts and managers since they have 
serious short and long term resource implications for research & development, product 
development, marketing, and manufacturing.  
Conventional wisdom holds that sales take-off times can primarily be explained in terms of 
supply-side factors (e.g., Bass 1980; Russell 1980; Metcalfe 1981; Foster, 1986; Stoneman and 
Ireland 1983; Golder and Tellis 1997).  According to this line of thought, increases in capacity 
associated with firm entry into a new market cause outward shifts in supply.  This puts   2
downward pressure on prices, which subsequently leads to increases in sales.  Thus, the 
prevailing belief is that price is the key explanatory variable in determining the sales take-off 
time, i.e., sales for product innovations are initially low due to their relatively high prices; then as 
prices of these products decline, the new product crosses a threshold of affordability and sales 
dramatically take off. 
In this paper, we argue that this explanation is incomplete.  Our fundamental idea is that a 
sales take-off is caused by outward shifting supply and demand curves
1.  Thus, we propose that 
sales are initially low due to the relative primitiveness of the first commercialized forms of new 
innovations, and increases in sales occur as new firms enter the market.  Firm entry not only 
affects supply but also demand for the product since product improvements, expanded 
distribution and increased consumer awareness of brand quality through promotional activities 
are key ways in which entering firms seek to differentiate themselves. We note that this 
explanation is consistent with findings in the economics and technology literature that firm 
competition in the early stages of new market growth focuses on continual product improvement 
(e.g., Shapiro 1986; Thomson 1986; Utterback 1994; Klepper 1997; Adner and Levinthal 2001).  
To provide empirical evidence for this explanation, we examine the role of price decreases 
and new firm entry in the initial take-off for a set of consumer and industrial product innovations 
commercialized in the US during the last 150 years. While recognizing that firm entry creates 
additional supply-side capacity, we follow prior research suggesting that entry in the formative 
stages of a new market is primarily associated with demand-side changes from incremental 
product improvements and efforts by firms to develop market infrastructure.  If entry is only 
associated with outward shifts in the supply curve, firm entry and price declines should be highly 
correlated, with each explaining roughly the same amount of variance in sales take-off times.  
Based on a proportional hazards analysis, we find that price reductions and new firm entry are 
significant explanatory variables.  However, price reductions account for less than 5 percent of 
the variance in sales take-off times while new firm entry explains almost 50 percent of this same 
variance.  Although we find no evidence of price mediating the effects of firm entry on sales 
take-off times, we find that price reductions matter more for products that can be improved with 
low R&D costs.  We interpret these results as supporting the idea that demand-side shifts during 
                                                 
1See, for example, the reviews in Stoneman (1983), Thirtle and Ruttan (1987), Karshenas and Stoneman (1995).    3
the early market evolution of new innovations due to non-price factors is the key driver of the 
timing of a sales take-off. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a 
theoretical framework for the role of firm entry in shifting demand and supply curves, and its 
impact on the timing of a sales take-off.  Section 3 presents an empirical analysis of the early 
market evolution and the take off phenomenon for a set of product innovations. Beginning with a 
description of the data sources and sample of consumer and industrial product innovations, we 
then outline our approach for identifying the take-off times and present descriptive statistics on 
key time intervals and empirical results based on proportional hazards analyses of take-off times. 
Finally, in Section 4 we discuss the implications associated with our empirical findings, and in 
Section 5 we outline several directions for future research.  
2. EXPLAINING THE TIMING OF A SALES TAKE-OFF 
Although our theoretical framework for the role of price decreases and incremental product 
improvements in leading to a sales take-off can be formalized mathematically, for ease of exposition 
we present our ideas in terms of simple supply and demand concepts.  Following the industrial 
organization literature (e.g., see the reviews in Geroski 1991; 1995), we focus on the role of firm 
entry in shifting the industry supply and demand curves.  As suggested by Figure 2, we note that the 
literature finds a sharp take-off in the number of firms in the early stages of market evolution (e.g., 
Gort and Klepper 1982; Rosegger and Baird 1987; Klepper and Graddy 1990; Utterback and Suarez 
1993; Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994; Utterback 1994; Agarwal and Gort 1996; Klepper and 
Simons 1997; 2000). However, this research does not directly consider the sales take-off 
phenomenon, as the emphasis is more on explaining the eventual evolution in market structure that 
occurs as an industry matures (Klepper 1997)
2.  
As suggested by these studies, firm entry into a new market results in increased capacity.  
Particularly in the context of new product markets, firm entry also may involve an increase in 
competition or decreases in production costs due to new process innovations.  Concentrating on this 
supply-side perspective, several researchers argue that a price decrease is the key factor leading to a 
                                                 
2Kim, Bridges, and Srivastava (1999) propose a multi-equation diffusion model for sales and the number of competitors. 
However, their ad hoc model formulation assumes that an imitation effect within the consumer and firm populations is 
the only driving force behind market growth, and their empirical analysis of three products does not concentrate on the 
early stages of market evolution and sales take-off. 
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take off in sales (e.g., Russell 1980; Foster 1986; Golder and Tellis 1997) and theoretical research 
concludes that optimal prices are decreasing when the supply curve shifts outward (e.g., Bass 1980; 
Metcalfe 1981; Stoneman and Ireland 1983; Klepper 1996). Empirical studies supporting this 
conclusion include Golder and Tellis (1997) who find quick sales take-off times for new 
consumer durables that have low relative prices, and Agarwal (1998) who reports declining price 
trends for most new consumer and industrial products.  
 
Figure 2: The Evolution of Market Structure for Product Innovations 
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At the same time however, the literature also indicates that firm entry during the early years 
of market evolution can shift the demand curve outward.  Demand increases stem from firm 
activities in new markets that are geared towards increasing actual or perceived product quality
3. 
As suggested by Gort and Klepper (1982), early entrants often bring crucial new information, 
skills and product quality improvements that result in demand increases. This is particularly 
important since the early commercialized forms of new innovations are generally quite primitive 
(e.g., Rosenberg 1982; 1994; Shapiro 1986; Thomson 1986; Klepper 1997). Further, as a new 
                                                 
3Using methods like hedonic price analysis to account for changes in product quality over time has a long and rich history 
in the economics literature (e.g., see the review in Gordon 1990). However, we do not employ such methods in our study.  
Aside from the fact that suitable data to conduct these analyses are unavailable for the product innovations we study, it is 
not clear that these methods are appropriate for the early market time periods of interest to our research.  In particular, 
hedonic analyses can only evaluate quality improvements when the product form has stabilized (i.e., the set of important 
attributes is established) which is not the case during the early evolution of new markets.  See Gordon (1990) for a 
discussion of other pitfalls associated with hedonic analyses. 
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market evolves, the consumer base expands due to increases in product offerings as well as 
product differentiation attempts by both new entrants and incumbents that respond to the threat 
caused by new entrants (e.g., Brown 1981; Bayus and Putsis 1999).  Several researchers note that 
competition during the early stages of market growth is primarily on the basis of continued 
product improvements (e.g., see reviews in Geroski 1991; 1995 and Klepper 1997). Consistent 
with this idea, Gort and Konakayama (1982) report a positive and significant relationship 
between firm entry and the rate of patenting for a sample of seven industrial innovations
4. 
In addition to the above studies examining broad indicators of product quality 
improvements through entry across several product-markets, detailed evidence of the relationship 
between early firm entry and product improvements is also available from various industry case 
studies (e.g., Christensen 1993; Utterback 1994). Consider, for example, the evolution of major 
product and process innovations (innovations ranked 4 or higher on a 7-point scale by Abernathy, 
Clark and Kantrow, 1983) in the automobile industry shown in Table 1. We note that firm entry 
in this industry accelerated only after 1899, and sales of automobiles did not take off until 1909. 
As discussed in Klepper and Simons (1997), product innovation in the automobile industry was 
greatest from commercialization until the first decade of the twentieth century, whereas process 
innovation was very low during this period.  More importantly, Klepper and Simons (1997) note 
that it was new entrants that contributed the largest share of product innovations, including the 
front-mounted four-cylinder engine, shaft-driven transmission and pressed steel frame, and 
caused the automobile to evolve from its bicycle and carriage origins towards the design of 
“luxury” cars pioneered in France. Introduced in 1908, Ford’s Model T represented the 
culmination of many of these incremental product improvements.  Not surprisingly, sales 
dramatically increased in 1909.  The later history of the automobile industry shows that the 
majority of process improvements came after 1909, with the most dramatic improvements in 
manufacturing occurring after the sales take-off when Ford pioneered the moving assembly line 
(1913-1914). Klepper and Simons (1997) state that with few exceptions, the industry’s major 
                                                 
4While patent statistics may seem like an obvious measure of incremental product improvements, it has several 
limitations.  For example, innovations vary in their impact on the technological environment and a count of patents will 
not necessarily capture the differences in the importance of innovations (e.g., Schmookler 1966; Pakes 1985).  Gort and 
Klepper (1982) note that patent counts do not clearly distinguish between product and process improvements, or between 
major and minor innovations.  Industries can also differ in their propensity to patent, due in part to existing tradeoffs 
between the exclusive rights granted by a patent and the loss of secrecy.  See Griliches (1990) for a general review of 
patent statistics and their use. 
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process innovations were dominated by the largest firms (Ford and General Motors).  Although 
anecdotal in nature, this example strongly suggests that product improvements in the automobile 
industry occurred during the early years of market evolution when firm entry was high. 
 
Table 1:  The Evolution of Major Product and Process Innovations  
in the Automobile Industry 
(source: Abernathy, Clark, and Kantrow 1983) 
 
Year  Firm  Product Innovation     Process Innovation 
1890 Commercialization 
1893 Duryea  Single  Plate  Clutch   
1895 Haynes-Apperson  Aluminum  Engine   
1896 King  En-Bloc  Engine   
1896 Duryea      1
st Multiple Production of One Car Design 
1898 Duryea  Internal-Expanding  Brakes   
1898  Columbus  Enclosed Car Body of Wood/Steel   
1899 Number of Firms Takes Off 
1899  Packard  Automatic Spark Advance   
1900  Most Producers      Gasoline Engine Mounted in Front 
1901 Autocar  1
st Shaft-Driven Am. Car   
1901  Oldsmobile      1
st Mass-Produced Auto 
1902  Locomobile  4-Cylinder, Front-Mounted Engine   
1902  Northern  3-Point Suspension of Power Unit   
1902 Northern  Planetary  Gear  Set   
1902  Northern  Integral Engine and Transmission Unit   
1902  Marmon      1
st All Metal Body (Aluminum Casting) 
1903  A.O. Smith  Pressed Steel Frame   
1904 Ford  Torque  Tube  Drive   
1906  Ford  Wiring Harness for Elec. System   
1907  Ford      Multiple Simultaneous Machining Ops 
1908  Ford  Detachable Cylinder Heads   
1908  Ford  Magneto Integrated into Flywheel   
1908  Ford      Vanadium Steel Components 
1909 Sales Take Off 
1910  Ford      1
st Branch Assembly Plants 
1913  Ford     Moving Flywheel-Magneto Assembly Line 
1914  Ford      Elevated Moving Chassis Assembly Line 
1914 Cadillac  (GM)  1
st Large Scale Production of V8 Engine   
1917  Ford      Baked Enamel Finishes 
1920  Ford      Continuous Pouring of Molten Iron 
 
Studies also indicate that product improvements, relative to process improvements, are 
typically emphasized in the early stages of a new market (e.g., Abernathy and Utterback 1978; 
Utterback 1994; Klepper 1996; 1997; Klepper and Simons 1997).  Thus, it is not surprising that 
the dramatic price decreases due to declining costs from process improvements and increasing    7
cumulative sales volume are usually observed only after the sales take-off (e.g., Bass 1980; 
Metcalfe 1981; Stoneman and Ireland 1983). 
  In addition to incremental product innovations, demand for the product may also increase 
from efforts by incumbents and new firms to increase perceived product quality
5.  For example, 
extensive advertising and promotion may be required to educate and inform potential consumers 
about the benefits of a new product innovation (e.g., the first phonographs brought the famous 
opera singer Caruso into your home). As suggested by Brown (1981), the timing of a sales take-
off for a product innovation may also be related to the existence and evolution of a market 
infrastructure, i.e., new firm entry may proxy for infrastructure development. This infrastructure 
can take different forms and might be established in various ways.  New distribution channels 
and pricing arrangements may be necessary for some innovations (e.g., sewing machines 
required the establishment of new retail outlets as well as credit terms). Widespread adoption of 
product innovations often requires the development of complementary products and services 
(e.g., automobiles needed roads and gas stations). These fundamental infrastructure 
developments often take place as a result of new entry into the market, either as new information 
is brought in by entrants or as competitive strategies of incumbents to stave off entry. 
  Thus, based on the discussion so far, new firm entry clearly impacts both the supply and 
demand of a new product innovation.  Accordingly, our first hypothesis highlights the 
importance of new firm entry in the take off of product innovations. 
H1:  Product innovations with a high (low) level of new firm entry have short (long) take-
off times. 
We next address the relative importance of demand and supply-side effects associated with 
firm entry as explanatory factors for sales take-off.  The related literature has generally 
emphasized supply-side effects, and thus concludes that price declines are the crucial determinant 
of sales take-off (e.g., Golder and Tellis 1997).  However, outward shifting demand and supply 
results in unambiguously increasing sales but an indeterminate price effect.  Further, the demand 
increasing efforts of firms may come at additional costs, which can affect product supply.  For 
example, crucial R&D expenditures in the early years of market evolution may actually increase 
costs, thereby offsetting effects of outward shifts in supply on price.  Thus, the possibility of 
                                                 
5We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing our attention to factors associated with new firm entry that may improve 
perceived quality of the product innovation.   8
outward shifting demand and supply implies that sales increases may be associated with either 
higher or lower prices.  Importantly, this ambiguity in price effects can possibly account for 
actual industry cases such as turbojet engines, cathode ray tubes and microwave ovens in which 
sales took off even though prices were increasing.   
Following prior empirical research, the isolated effects of supply shifts during the early 
stages of new market formation can be assessed by relating a direct measure of price decreases to 
take-off times.  By studying the relationship between price decreases, new firm entry, and take-
off times across a set of product innovations, we can also explore the role of shifting supply and 
demand curves in leading to a sales take-off.  To the extent that supply-side factors alone drive 
take-off times, price declines and firm entry should be highly correlated, with each separately 
accounting for very similar amounts of variance in observed take-off times. On the other hand, if 
demand-side factors are also important, firm entry should contribute some explanatory power 
beyond price decreases in explaining observed take-off times (since in this case, firm entry will 
include the effects of price decreases due to both supply and demand changes).  If demand shifts, 
due to the non-price factors associated with new firm entry, are a key driver of take-off times, 
firm entry should dominate price as an explanatory variable of take-off times.  Alternatively, if 
price mediates the relationship between firm entry and take-off time, then a statistically 
significant relationship between firm entry and take-off time should disappear when price is 
added to the model (e.g., Baron and Kenny 1986). 
Based on this discussion, our second set of competing hypotheses addresses the relative 
importance of supply (measured directly by changes in price) and demand (measured indirectly 
as the impact of new firm entry after accounting for price effects) in explaining take-off times. 
H2a:  Supply-side effects, as measured by price changes, dominate demand-side effects in 
explaining the take-off times of product innovations (i.e., changes in price and new 
firm entry account for the same amount of variance in take-off times). 
H2b:  Demand-side effects, as measured by the differential impact of new firm entry over 
price changes, dominate supply-side effects in explaining the take-off times of 
product innovations (i.e., price does not mediate the relationship between new firm 
entry and take-off). 
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3.  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARKET TAKE-OFF  
In this section, we focus our attention on the sales take-off time and possible explanations 
for its variation across products.  Similar to prior research efforts, we do not consider the possible 
sales patterns after take-off (e.g., some products like 8-track tape and videodisc players did 
achieve a sales take-off but had very short market lifetimes). Since we use secondary data to 
empirically study the market evolution of product innovations, our study is consistent with prior 
research in that we only consider “successful” innovations.  However, this concern is mitigated 
by the fact that new products historically exhibit a wide variation in the time to sales take-off. 
Since several products in our sample take well over twenty years before achieving a take-off 
(e.g., see Figure 1), innovations that could have been considered “failures” based on their very 
low sales in the early years of industry formation are included in our analysis. We also examine 
the take-off phenomenon for industrial as well as consumer products. 
3.1  Data Sources  
  To develop an appropriate sample of innovations, we began by consulting various 
technical sources, scientific journals, chronologies, and encyclopedias of new inventions.  To be 
considered for inclusion in our study, a consumer or industrial product innovation had to be 
deemed significant by experts in the field, and result in entirely new product-markets rather than 
improvements or sub-sections of existing markets.  Once an appropriate list of innovations was 
identified, the hurdle then became the availability of consistent data for variables related to both 
demand (sales, price) and market structure (number of firms). 
Accurate historical data on new product-markets are typically very difficult to obtain, 
and even harder is the task of matching sales and price information to data on entry and the 
number of firms competing in the market. While there are several consumer and industrial 
product innovations for which sales and price information are available, often data on the entry, 
exit and number of firms are not readily available (or vice versa). After several hundred person-
hours of research, we were able to develop consistent time series data on the key variables for 
30 product innovations introduced in the U.S. between 1849 and 1983 (see Table 2 for a list of 
the product innovations). Our sample size compares favorably with the average sample size of 
14 product categories used in prior new product diffusion studies (Sultan, Farley, and Lehmann 
1990).  These 30 innovations encompass a broad spectrum of important products introduced 
over the past 150 years, and include a diverse mix of consumer and industrial products, as well   10
as products that vary in their capital and technological intensiveness. In addition, the product 
innovations we study overlap with those studied by other researchers (i.e., Table 2 includes 13 
of the new consumer durables examined by Golder and Tellis 1997, and 11 of the consumer and 
industrial innovations studied by Gort and Klepper 1982). 
 
Table 2:  Key Dates for Our Sample of Product Innovations 
 
Product  “Invention” 
Year 
“Commercialization” 
Year 
Firm Take-
Off Year 
Sales Take-
Off Year 
Sewing Machine  1830  1849  1853  1859 
Automobile 1771  1890  1899  1909 
Phonograph Record  1877  1897  1917  1919 
Vacuum Cleaner  1907  1911  1928  1934 
Outboard Engine  1905  1913  1916  1936 
Electric Blanket  1914  1915  1923  1952 
Dishwasher 1898  1915  1951  1955 
Radio 1912  1919  1922  1923 
Clothes Washer  1901  1921  1923  1933 
Freon Compressor  1930  1935  1938  1964 
Cathode Ray Tube  1897  1935  1943  1949 
Clothes Dryer  1930  1935  1946  1950 
Electric Razor  1928  1937  1938  1943 
Styrene 1831  1938  1943  1946 
Piezoelectric Crystals  1880  1941  1944  1973 
Home Freezer  1924  1946  1947  1950 
Antibiotics 1928  1948  1950  1956 
Turbojet Engine  1934  1948  1949  1951 
Ball-Point Pen  1888  1948  1957  1958 
Garbage Disposer  1929  1949  1953  1955 
Magnetic Recording Tape  1928  1952  1953  1968 
Heat Pump  1851  1954  1960  1976 
Computer Printer  1944  1960  1971  1979 
Home Microwave Oven  1947  1970  1974  1976 
Monitor 1927  1971  1975  1981 
Microcomputer 1962  1974  1977  1982 
Home VCR  1951  1974  1975  1980 
Compact Disc Player  1979  1983  1984  1985 
Cellular Telephone  1970  1983  1985  1986 
Optical Disc Drive  1979  1984  1987  1993 
 
Annual data were gathered for these 30 products from a variety of published sources (see 
the Appendix for a summary of these sources).  Since we had no prior information on the actual 
take-off times for each product, the collected data generally extended well beyond the   11
introduction and growth stages.  Information on the commercialization date, entry, exit and 
number of firms producing the product in any given year were mainly compiled from the 
Thomas Register of American Manufacturers, a source that has been widely used to study the 
evolution of markets (e.g., Gort and Klepper 1982; Klepper and Graddy 1990; Jovanovic and 
MacDonald 1994; Agarwal and Gort 1996; Klepper and Simons 2000; Robinson and Min 
2001)
6.  The Thomas Register, which dates back to 1906, is a national buying guide that is used 
primarily by purchasing agents
7.  In extensively describing various sources of business 
information, Lavin (1992) states that the Thomas Register is the best example of a directory that 
provides information on manufacturers by focusing on products. According to Lavin (1992), 
“The  Thomas Register is a comprehensive, detailed guide to the full range of products 
manufactured in the United States.  Covering only manufacturing companies, it strives for a 
complete representation within that scope.” In choosing product markets, we excluded those 
product markets for which there was a lack of consistency of boundaries between the Thomas 
Register and those defined by other agencies such as the U.S. Census of Manufacturers and 
various trade organizations.  This ensured accurate matching of the data for the number of firms 
with data on sales and price information.  In addition, multiple Thomas Register categories were 
combined as needed to ensure the inclusion of all competitors in a market
8. Firm listings were 
also subjected to several checks to ensure actual market entry rather than a renaming, relocation, 
or merger between existing firms (see Agarwal 1997 for details).  We also used the asset size 
class reported in the Thomas Register to categorize firms as large or small after appropriately 
adjusting the boundaries of these classes over time to account for inflation
9. 
                                                 
6Some product innovations introduced in the nineteenth century were added because reliable information was available 
from reputable published sources (see Appendix A). While we recognize that many innovations were commercialized in 
local markets shortly after their invention (often by the inventors themselves), we follow Gort and Klepper (1982) and 
Agarwal and Gort (1996) by assuming that the “commercialization” year is the first year the product was listed in the 
Thomas Register. 
 
7The importance of imports in manufacturing has increased over the last few decades.  The Thomas Register includes 
foreign manufacturers of the product if the firm maintains an office or distribution channel for its product in the United 
States.  Foreign firms that operate plants in the U.S. are also included. 
 
8For example, “Machinery: Dishwashing and Dishwashers” are two categories that list manufacturers of dishwashers.  In 
these instances when firms might be listed in each category, we were careful to avoid the double counting of firms. 
  
9The smallest of the five broad asset categories reported in the Thomas Register represented assets less than $1.4M (in 
1982 dollars) at the turn of the century.  We used this cut-point to define “small” firms and, over time, consecutive asset 
categories were added to the “small” firm definition to appropriately adjust for inflation. 
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Data for sales and average price were compiled from a variety of sources (see Appendix 
A) widely used by other researchers (e.g., Golder and Tellis 1997; Agarwal 1998). The annual 
prices for each product were either deflated by the Consumer Price Index (consumer products) 
or the Producer Price Index (industrial products) to correct for inflation and general productivity 
changes (economy wide rather than product specific).  Finally, we also estimated an “invention” 
year for each product innovation based on several published sources (e.g., Giscard d’Estaing 
1986) and analyses (e.g., Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman 1958; Enos 1962; Mensch 1979; 
Kohli, Lehmann, and Pae 1999).  We recognize, however, that there is considerable controversy 
over the accuracy of dating inventions (e.g., Freeman, Clark, and Soete 1982; Rosenberg 1994).  
Thus, these dates are only included to fill out the timeline of market evolution, and should be 
used with caution. 
3.2 Key Variable Definitions and Hypotheses 
Our two key explanatory variables are price declines and firm entry.  In addition, we 
consider several control variables, including year of commercialization, World War 2, and 
product type.  We do not include other economy-wide variables such as GNP since none were 
significant in explaining the take-off times. The variables we consider are summarized in Table 
3 as well as briefly discussed below. 
Changes in Price.  To measure changes in price, we follow prior observations (e.g., Bass 1995) 
and empirical analyses (e.g., Bayus 1992) by fitting an exponential time trend (λe
θt) to the 
annual price series for each innovation.  As expected, excellent fits are obtained.  In this way, 
our measure of changes in Price is the estimated exponential coefficient θ (which is independent 
of take-off times). 
New Firm Entry.  We define the annual percentage of new entrants as the ratio of the number 
of entrants (net of exits) to the total number of competitors in any year and compute our 
measure of New Firm Entry between commercialization and the year prior to sales take-off as 
the average of the annual values during that period.  Letting n = period in which sales take off, 
we have 
New Firm Entry =  ∑
−
= −
1
1 #
#
1
1
n
i i
i
firms
entrants
n
 
 New Firm Entry for the other time periods is defined similarly.   13
Year of Commercialization.  Since our sample of product innovations encompasses a time 
horizon of more than a century, it is highly likely that there have been significant changes in the 
economic climate in which firms operate.  Some notable examples include the broad leaps in 
communications and transportation, the general growth in GNP, and the expansion of 
populations and markets (through globalization, etc.). The year of product commercialization is 
one way to control for any systematic changes that may have occurred in the underlying 
structural conditions and barriers to entry across our sample of product innovations over time. 
Consistent with prior research, we expect that the effect of Commercialization Year on the 
probability of take-off is positive. 
World War 2.  Major economic upheavals due to events such as World War 2 can affect take 
off times.  Therefore, our analyses include a dummy variable controlling for the possible effects 
of World War 2 on take-off times. We expect that the take-off time is greater for an innovation 
if World War 2 occurred between its commercialization and its time to firm or sales take-off
10. 
Product Type.  The variation in take-off times across product innovations may be related to 
product characteristics
11.  In particular, the resources required to improve an early 
commercialized form of a new product is expected to be negatively associated with take-off 
times.  We control for the possible relationship between take-off times and product 
improvement costs by including a measure of R&D costs.  Cross sectional differences in the 
product markets are measured by constructing a “steady-state” measure of R&D Costs, 
calculated as average R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales between 1987-1997 for each 
innovation in our sample (at the three-digit SIC level) using NSF data.  Although we recognize 
that this is a crude measure, it represents the best set of consistent data that are available
12.  We 
also note that the mean R&D costs in our sample of products (4.92) is not statistically different 
                                                 
10Although not reported here, our analyses revealed that effects due to World War 1 and the Great Depression are 
insignificant. 
 
11We also examined a dummy variable capturing whether the innovation is a component or factor of production for other 
product “systems” (i.e., outboard engine, freon compressor, cathode ray tube, styrene, piezoelectric crystals, turbojet 
engine, magnetic recording tape, heat pump) or a good for final consumption.  No significant results were obtained. 
 
12We note that relying on the later years for this measure of R&D costs may seem biased against products introduced 
early in the century since technological intensity varies over the product life cycle and is expected to be highest when a 
product innovation is first introduced.  However, this concern is partly alleviated by two facts.  One, the technological 
intensity of the industries is remarkably stable over a long period of time (e.g. chemicals, aircrafts, communications, etc).  
Two, several of the product innovations in our study that are associated with high R&D costs were introduced early in the 
century (e.g. automobiles).   14
from the mean R&D costs across all US industries (4.67), indicating that our sample does not 
over-represent high R&D cost industries. 
 
Table 3: Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
(between commercialization and sales take-off) 
 
Variable 
 
Definition Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 
Changes in Price 
(Price) 
 
 
Estimated coefficient from an exponential 
time trend 
 
-0.06 
 
0.14 
 
New Firm Entry 
 
∑
−
= −
1
1 #
#
1
1
n
i i
i
firms
entrants
n
 
 
0.30 
 
0.20 
 
Year of 
Commercialization 
 
 
Year of product commercialization 
(see Table 2) 
 
 
 
1939.83 
 
 
30.11 
 
 
World War 2 
 
 
=1 if WW2 occurred between 
commercialization and take-off 
=0 otherwise 
 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
0.42 
 
Product Type 
(R&D Costs) 
 
 
Average R&D expenditures as a percentage 
of sales  (1987-1997) 
 
 
 
4.92 
 
 
3.33 
 
3.3  Determining Take-Off Times 
To consistently identify take-off times, we follow Gort and Klepper (1982) and Agarwal 
and Gort (1996) by using a statistical procedure that is based on a generalized version of 
discriminant analysis.  Briefly, this methodology allows us to distinguish between any two 
consecutive intervals by examining the data on annual percentage change in sales (for the sales 
take-off) and annual net entry rates (for firm take-off) for each product.  To determine the take-
off year for a product, we first partition the appropriate series into three categories---the first and 
third categories contain the years where the percentage change in sales or net entry rate clearly 
reflect the pre- and post-take-off periods, respectively.  Periods for the “in-between” years are 
then optimally classified based on mean values. 
As a final validity check, we also carefully matched the calculated take-off times with 
information in available published histories of the product innovations. Applying this procedure   15
to each of our 30 product innovations gives the take-off times reported in Table 2.  For the set of 
product innovations we consider, it is clear that the firm and sales take-off years do indeed 
represent sharp increases over the prior year since, on average, the percentage change in the 
number of firms at firm take-off is +123% and the percentage change in sales at sales take-off is 
+136%. 
3.4  Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics on key variables.  In agreement with the 
literature (e.g., Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman 1958; Mensch 1979; Kohli, Lehmann, and Pae 
1999), the time between invention and commercialization is generally very long (the average for 
our product innovations is almost 30 years).  Consistent with Schumpeter’s (1939; 1943) thesis 
that early entrants into a new market base their entry decisions on expected rather than realized 
sales, Table 2 shows that firm take-off precedes sales take-off for every one of our 30 product 
innovations.  Moreover, for 26 of the 30 innovations, firm take-off preceded sales take-off by 
three or more years. As shown in Figure 4, the mean time between commercialization and firm 
take-off is just over 6 years for our set of innovations, and the mean time between firm and sales 
take-off is 8 years. 
Table 4 suggests that the time intervals vary by commercialization year. In particular, the 
time between commercialization and firm take-off has significantly declined over time for this 
set of product innovations, and the time between commercialization and sales take-off has also 
shrunk.  Interestingly, the time between firm and sales take-off has not significantly declined 
over this period. In addition, Table 4 suggests that the fraction of large entrants has increased 
over the last 150 years (e.g., see also Chandler 1977). 
Figure 4 reports that New Firm Entry between commercialization and firm take-off for 
our set of innovations is 55%, i.e. over half of the competitors in each year before the firm take-
off tend to be new entrants.  However, these firms still only represent 13% of all potential 
competitors (see the Relative # Firms Ratio in Figure 4, defined as the ratio of the number of 
firms to the peak number of firms over the observed product life cycle). New Firm Entry 
between the firm and sales take-off is 30%, and by the year of sales take-off, 44% of all the 
potential competitors have already entered the market.  Together, these results indicate that 
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Figure 4:  Descriptive Statistics for the Market Evolution of Product Innovations 
(Means) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At Sales Take-Off 
% Change in Sales = 136% 
% Change in # Firms = 16% 
Relative # Firms Ratio = 44% 
At Firm Take-Off 
% Change in # Firms = 123% 
% Change in Sales = 63% 
Relative # Firms Ratio = 13% 
Between Firm and Year Prior to Sales Take-Off 
New Firm Entry = 30% 
% Change in Price = -40% 
% Entrant Firms that are Small = 45% 
Between Commercialization and Year Prior to Firm Take-Off 
New Firm Entry = 55% 
% Change in Price = -31% 
% Entrant Firms that are Small = 42% 
8.0 years 6.2 years 28.1 years 
Sales 
Take-Off
Firm 
Take-Off
Commercialization Invention 
time
 
 
Table 4:  The Market Evolution of Product Innovations 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
 
Products 
Commercialized  
Invention to 
Commercialization 
Commercialization 
to Firm Take-Off 
Firm to Sales 
Take-Off 
Commercialization 
to Sales Take-Off 
Average Number 
      of Years 
Before WW2  27.07  9.29  9.43  18.71 
After WW2  29.00  3.50  6.75  10.25 
  (-0.16) (2.18)
b (0.89) (2.40)
a 
% Entrants That  
    Are Small 
Before  WW2  NA  56 52 54 
After  WW2  NA  30 40 36 
   (2.71)
a (1.20) (2.20)
b 
n=30; 
asignificant at 0.01 level; 
bsignificant at 0.05 level 
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almost one-third of all the eventual competitors (i.e., Relative # Firms Ratio at sales take-off 
less Relative # Firms Ratios at firm take-off) enter in the period between firm and sales take-off,  
i.e., a large fraction of the competitors in a new market enter before the sales take-off (although 
over half of a new market’s eventual competitors do enter after the sales take-off).  These 
statistics strongly suggest that the monopoly period for a product innovation is brief at best, and 
occurs well before the product growth stage. 
Based on the estimated exponential price trends for each innovation, Figure 4 also 
reports that the percentage change in price between commercialization and year prior to firm 
take-off is –31%, and between firm and year prior to sales take-off is –40%.  Clearly, prices are 
declining over time for this set of product innovations. 
Although the details are not reported here, we also explored the potential relationship 
between firm entry, entrant size, and market opportunity.  We find that New Firm Entry between 
commercialization and year prior to firm take-off is a significant negative correlate with the 
percentage of entrant firms that are small (r=-0.41; p≤0.05).  On the other hand, entrant size is 
not significantly related to New Firm Entry between firm and year prior to sales take-off. 
Although entrepreneurs may play a pivotal role in the initial commercialization of a product 
innovation (e.g., Schumpeter 1943; Feller 1967), these results suggest that the entry of larger 
firms with greater resources and commitment to build the market may attract other firms to the 
nascent industry.  These results are also consistent with the idea that potential industry 
participants need some signal (e.g., the participation of larger firms) that an infant industry is 
“legitimate” before they enter en masse (e.g., Aldrich 1999; Van de Ven, et al. 1999).  We also 
find that New Firm Entry between firm and year prior to sales take-off is a significant negative 
correlate with the relative number of firms at take-off (r=-0.40; p≤0.05).  At the same time, the 
relative number of firms is not significantly related to New Firm Entry between 
commercialization and year prior to firm take-off.  These results suggest that the entrants after 
firm take-off base their entry decision on perceived market opportunities as reflected by the 
remaining competitive potential associated with the product innovation.  Not surprisingly, these 
entrants generally want to get to market before the competitive landscape is fully established 
(e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery 1998).   
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3.5  Estimation Approach and Results 
We use Cox’s (1972) proportional hazards regression model to study sales take-off 
times. The proportional hazards model is appropriate since it allows for estimation of the 
determinants of the hazard rate, i.e., the probability of take-off in period t given that the product 
has not taken off till period t-1.  See Helsen and Schmittlein (1993) for an excellent discussion 
of this model and its benefits over other modeling approaches. 
For the i
th product, the hazard rate function hi(t) is defined as 
log hi (t) = log h(t; xi) = α(t) + x′i  β                                         (1) 
where α(t) is an arbitrary and unspecified baseline hazard function, xi is a vector of measured 
explanatory variables for the i
th product, and β is the vector of unknown coefficients to be 
estimated.  As suggested by Allison (1984), we do not include a term for unobserved 
heterogeneity since we only analyze non-repeated events. Parameter estimation is accomplished 
using the partial likelihood method as implemented in the SAS PHREG procedure. To account 
for the possibility that two product innovations have the same observed take-off time, we 
assume that there is a true but unknown ordering for the tied events times and use the EXACT 
method in the SAS PHREG procedure (e.g., see Allison 1995 for details)
13. 
Table 5 reports the results of our proportional hazards analyses of sales take-off times
14.  
We note that the same basic results are also obtained for various sub-samples of the product 
innovations.  We use McFadden’s (1974) Likelihood Ratio Index, ρ
2 (which, for our models, is 
the same as the U
2 measure discussed by Hauser 1978), as a measure of model fit (0<ρ
2<1).  
The Likelihood Ratio Index is calculated as 1 – L(x)/L0, where L(x) is the log likelihood of the 
model with covariates and L0 is the null model. 
From the results presented in Table 5, New Firm Entry is significant and in the expected 
direction for all models.  Thus, H1 is strongly supported, i.e., a sales take-off occurs quickly 
(slowly) for innovations with a high (low) fraction of new entrants.  As indicated by the results 
                                                 
13Since the price trend for some of our product innovations is positive, we allow for the possibility of non-proportional 
hazards using stratification (Allison 1995). In this case, α(t) in equation (1) is replaced by αj(t) to allow the arbitrary 
function of time to differ for the two situations (i.e., θ is positive or negative).  This model is estimated using the partial 
likelihood method by: (1) constructing separate partial likelihood functions for the two groups of innovations, (2) 
multiplying these two functions together, and (3) choosing values of β that maximize this function.  This procedure is 
implemented in the SAS PHREG procedure using the STRATA option (see Allison 1995 for details). 
 
14The conclusions in this section are supported by other hazard analyses not reported here (but which are available from 
the authors) for the time between commercialization and firm take-off and the time between firm and sales take-off.     19
for Model 1, Price decreases are significantly related to sales take-off times.  In addition, Model 
4 reports the estimation results with the other control variables: Commercialization Year and 
World War 2 are not significant, whereas R&D Costs is negative and significant.  This latter 
result suggests that product innovations for which there are relatively high costs of improvement 
tend to have longer take-off times. 
 
Table 5: Proportional Hazards Analysis 
of the Probability of Sales Take-Off After Commercialization
 
(standard errors in parentheses)    
   
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 
Price 
 
-6.54 
(3.23)
a 
 
- 
 
1.98 
(4.24) 
 
4.50 
(4.22) 
 
-17.38 
(13.31)
c 
 
New Firm Entry  
 
- 
 
16.17 
(3.69)
a 
 
16.64 
(3.86)
a 
 
22.16 
(6.01)
a 
 
21.09 
(5.91)
a 
 
Commercialization Year 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
World War 2 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
0.37 
(0.86) 
 
0.28 
(0.87) 
 
R&D Costs 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.27 
(0.14)
a 
 
-0.08 
(0.20) 
 
Price x R&D Costs 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
3.37 
(1.96)
b 
 
ρ
2 
-2LL 
Chi-Square 
 
0.04 
98.18 
3.68
b 
 
0.46 
55.01 
46.85
a 
 
0.46 
54.78 
47.08
a 
 
0.51 
49.49 
52.37
a 
 
0.55 
45.74 
56.12
a 
n=30; 
asignificant at 0.01 level; 
bsignificant at 0.05 level; 
csignificant at 0.10 level; one-tail significance tests 
 
Following Cohen and Cohen (1983), we compare the ρ
2 values of the various models to 
determine the relative importance of the factors.  Clearly, the ρ
2 values for the single-variable 
model of New Firm Entry (Model 2: ρ
2=0.46) is much larger than the single-variable ρ
2 model 
value for Price (Model 1: ρ
2=0.04).  In addition, the ρ
2 values of the multivariate models 
(Models 3 and 4) are only marginally larger than the single-variable model of New Firm Entry 
(Model 2), indicating that the other variables do not contribute much additional explanatory   20
power over New Firm Entry.  Thus, it must be the case that our measure of New Firm Entry 
captures much more than just the effects of price decreases alone
15.   
In addition, we find no evidence that price mediates the relationship between firm entry 
and take-off times.  Following Baron and Kenny (1986), price acts as a mediator when: (1) take-
off time is significantly related to price and firm entry separately, (2) price and firm entry are 
significantly related, and (3) a significant relationship between firm entry and sales take-off time 
disappears when price is added to the model.  Condition 1 is satisfied since the results for Model 
1 in Table 5 is significant, but Condition 2 is not met since the Pearson correlation between 
Price and New Firm Entry is insignificant (r = -0.18; p<0.35).  Examining the results for Models 
2 and 3, we also find that Condition 3 is not met, i.e., rather than having the relationship 
between  New Firm Entry and take-off time disappear with the addition of Price,  Price is 
insignificant in a model with New Firm Entry
16.   
Taking these results together, we find strong evidence that firm entry into a new market 
dominates price in explaining the timing of a sales take-off.  Thus, H2b is supported. Given our 
discussion in Section 2, we interpret these results as supporting the idea that demand shifts due 
to actual and perceived improvements in product quality during the early market evolution of 
innovations is the key driver of a sales take-off.   
At the same time however, the fact that prices are generally declining over time suggests 
that the supply curve is also shifting outward.  Since both the demand and supply curves are 
shifting outward, we further explore two possible explanations for our empirical results that firm 
entry explains sales take off better than price reductions
17.  First, it may be that growth in 
demand leads to a transitory disequilibrium which delays price reductions.  In this case, the 
duration of disequilibrium should be inversely related to entry barriers in the market.  However, 
                                                 
15It is noteworthy that the ρ
2 values we report in Table 5 (Models 2-5) are much higher than the ρ
2 value of 0.31 reported 
by Golder and Tellis (1997). 
 
16We note that there may be several reasons why some factors are significant in a single-variable model, yet 
insignificant in a multivariate model.  For example, it is possible that after controlling for New Firm Entry, the 
other factors do not affect the likelihood of take-off.  More likely though, is that the model without New Firm Entry 
is mis-specified (i.e., there is an omitted variable in this model).  Thus, it may be that the estimated coefficient for 
Price is biased upwards, resulting in the significant conclusions for the single variable model in Model 1. 
 
17We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these explanations. 
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as noted above the correlation between Price (a proxy for price reduction lags
18) and New Firm 
Entry (a proxy for entry barriers) is insignificant.  This suggests that the speed of price declines 
(and thus price lags) is not related to barriers to entry.  A second possible explanation is that the 
R&D costs related to product improvements may vary greatly across innovations and these 
R&D costs may offset the effects of manufacturing cost reducing process innovations or 
additional capacity that are associated with price reductions.  Consistent with this idea, we find 
that the correlation of Price and R&D Costs is positive and significant (r = 0.43; p = 0.01). In 
addition, Price and R&D Costs should have a positive interactive effect on the probability of 
take-off (i.e., the effect of price reductions on sales take-off is observed for innovations that 
have relatively low costs of product improvements).  We note that this explanation is consistent 
with our emphasis on the critical role of product improvements in the early stages of new 
markets.  From Model 5 in Table 5, we find that Price and New Firm Entry are significant and 
have the expected coefficient signs
19.  Moreover, the interaction of Price and R&D Costs is 
significant and has a positive effect on the probability of a sales take-off for our set of product 
innovations.  This result suggests that innovations with steep price declines (i.e., Price<<0) and 
low costs of product improvement tend to have higher probabilities of sales take-off than 
innovations with steep price declines and high R&D costs.  Thus, although New Firm Entry is 
still the dominant explanatory variable of a sales take-off, we find evidence that a sales take-off 
occurs quickly with price reductions in product innovations for which the costs associated with 
quality improvements are relatively low
20. 
4.  DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Three key findings emerge from our empirical analyses of the market evolution and 
take-off of consumer and industrial product innovations. 
                                                 
18Similar conclusions are obtained for other measures of price lags, including time to a 5% reduction in price after take-
off and average price reduction one year after take-off. 
 
19Since we have specific hypotheses about the coefficient signs, we use one-tail significance levels in Table 5.  The same 
basic conclusion is also obtained using two tailed tests with a more “lenient” alpha level of 0.20 (see Stevens 1996 for a 
discussion of improving the power of statistical tests for small samples using higher alpha level tests).  See Boland, et. al. 
(2001) for a recent example that uses an 80 percent confidence level for analyses involving small samples. 
 
20It is interesting to note that the correlation between Price and New Firm Entry is negative and significant for the 13 
product innovations in our sample that were also analyzed by Golder and Tellis (1997).  We further note that R&D costs 
for these 13 products are not significantly different from the other 17 products.  These results suggest that price reductions 
may play a more important role for the consumer durables considered by Golder and Tellis (1997) than for the broader set 
of consumer and industrial product innovations we study.   22
(1) We find that sales and the number of competing firms for consumer and industrial 
product innovations exhibit an initial period of slow growth that is eventually followed 
by sharp take-off. 
 
(2) We find that the time between firm and sales take-off varies considerably across 
products, and that a firm take-off systematically occurs before the sales take-off. This 
suggests that the market entry decisions of early entrants are based on expected sales 
rather than actual realized sales. 
 
(3) We find strong evidence that firm entry into a new market dominates price reductions in 
explaining take-off times.  We interpret this result as supporting the idea that demand 
shifts during the early evolution of a new market due to non-price factors is the key 
driver of a sales take-off. 
 
Our first finding adds to the limited empirical research on the take-off phenomenon that 
has appeared in distinct literatures, i.e., evidence for a sales take-off is reported in Golder and 
Tellis (1997) and for a firm take-off in Gort and Klepper (1982). Our second and third findings 
represent new empirical results that have not as yet been reported in the published literature.  
Our third finding is also good news for managers of product innovations since it suggests that 
sales growth does not have to necessarily come at the expense of compressed profit margins 
typically associated with declining prices. 
Our findings add to the set of empirical regularities that have been reported in the 
literature (e.g., see the review in Klepper 1997). Based on our accumulated knowledge to this 
point, we speculate that the market evolution for a product innovation unfolds as follows. First, 
there is an initial discovery of a potential product innovation.  Typically a long incubation 
period ensues after the pioneering invention, which is eventually followed by the 
commercialization of various specific product forms by one or more small and/or large firms. 
Based on early competitive activity in the nascent market (e.g., the relative number of initial 
entrants that are small entrepreneurs or large corporations, the early entrants’ level of success, 
etc.), potential entrants update their assessments of the benefits and risks associated with entry. 
As the new market evolves over time, competing firms collectively legitimize it to be a real 
opportunity.  The number of firms competing in the new market then takes off as entrants rush 
in anticipating large profits.  As a result, supply-side capacity increases.  Demand also increases 
due to the aggressive non-price competition that occurs among incumbents and entrants in new 
oligopolistic markets, i.e., in the early stages of market evolution, fierce competition usually 
centers on demand enhancing efforts such as R&D directed towards product improvements.   23
Depending on the specific product innovation and the nature of its supply and demand curves, 
prices can decrease or increase.  As a result of this competitive activity, consumers eventually 
legitimize the product innovation by accepting that it provides real benefits over existing 
products.  Sales of the product innovation then take off. After the sales take-off, both sales and 
the number of competing firms continue to increase but at a decreasing rate.  Eventually, there is 
a shakeout of firms in the industry, and the number of competitors drops and then stabilizes.  
We note however, that this “story” is speculative at this point since it has not been formally 
tested with a complete set of empirical data. 
5.  FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Although our results strongly suggest that non-price competition associated with new 
firm entry rather than price decreases drives sales take-off for product innovations, research 
involving other measures of product evolution and improvement should be conducted to 
confirm this finding.  Furthermore, our results imply that models of new product sales need to 
explicitly account for the take-off phenomenon and product evolution during the early stages of 
market development. Thus for example, future research dealing with sales diffusion models 
(e.g., Bass 1980; Mahajan, Muller and Bass 1990) and models of the evolution of new markets 
(e.g., Klepper and Graddy 1990; Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994; Klepper 1996) should make 
provisions to account for these findings. It is likely that such research will require additional 
theoretical modeling of the take-off phenomenon. 
Efforts by new entrants to increase sales may take many forms, including product 
improvements, promotional activities that educate consumers, and market infrastructure 
development associated with expanded distribution.  While our results link new firm entry to 
sales take-off, further research is needed to assess the importance of each of these demand-
enhancing factors.  For instance, as suggested by Brown (1981), the time between firm and sales 
take-off for a product innovation may be related to the existence and evolution of a market 
infrastructure. This infrastructure can take different forms and might be established in various 
ways.  Thus, it may be that the market infrastructure for a product innovation must be developed 
before a sales take-off can occur, and perhaps occurs concurrently or ensues shortly after entry.  
This line of reasoning suggests that an important topic for future research is to empirically 
investigate the relationship between firm entry, market infrastructure development, and sales 
take-off.   24
Our empirical results also indicate that competition is important to the market evolution 
and take-off of product innovations.  In particular, we find that a sharp increase in the number of 
competing firms in a new market precedes a sales take-off and high firm entry rates are 
associated with quicker sales take-offs.  Thus, our results imply that a strategy of erecting entry 
barriers is not conducive to the market take-off of a product innovation, i.e., monopolies 
dampen the growth of new markets.  In addition, firms may be able to collectively influence the 
take-off of a product innovation. Consequently, individual firm decisions on advertising 
expenditures, distribution policies, and product development (e.g., technology standards and 
cross-licensing policies) may influence own brand sales as well as the growth rate of the total 
market.  With an eye towards identifying the factors related to a swift sales take-off, future 
research could thus empirically and analytically investigate the nature of firm alliances and 
collaborations during the formative stages of a new market.   25
APPENDIX  
Summary of Data Sources 
 
Product     Sales & Price     Number of Firms 
Sewing  Machine   BC,  Brandon    Cooper 
Automobile    MVMA     Smith 
Phonograph  Record   BC,  BLS    TR 
Vacuum  Cleaner   DM     TR       
Outboard Engine    BC, BLS, Predicasts    TR  
Electric  Blanket    DM     TR 
Dishwasher    DM     TR 
Radio     DM     Grinder 
Clothes  Washer    DM     TR 
Freon  Compressor   Predicasts    TR 
Cathode Ray Tube    EMDB, BLS, Predicasts    TR 
C l o t h e s   D r y e r     D M      T R  
Electric  Razor    DM     TR 
S t y r e n e      I T C      T R  
Piezoelectric  Crystals   Predicasts    TR 
H o m e   F r e e z e r     D M      T R  
Antibiotics    ITC     TR 
Turbojet  Engine    AIAA     TR 
Ball-Point  Pen    WIMA,  BLS    TR 
Garbage  Disposer   DM     TR 
Magnetic Recording Tape  Predicasts      TR 
Heat  Pump    Predicasts    TR 
Computer  Printer   ITI,  Filson    TR,  Filson 
Home  Microwave  Oven   DM     TR 
Monitor   ITI,  Filson    TR,  Filson 
Microcomputer    IDC     IDC 
Home  VCR    DM     TR,  LNA 
Compact  Disc  Player   DM     TR,  LNA 
Cellular  Telephone   DM     TR,  LNA 
Optical Disc Drive    Disk/Trend, Golder    TR 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
AIAA: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Aerospace Facts and Figures 
BC: Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers & Annual Survey of Manufacturers 
BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer Price Index (previous name: Wholesale Price Index) 
Brandon: Brandon, R. (1977), A Capitalist Romance, New York: Lippincott Publishing 
Cooper: Cooper, G. (1968), The Invention of the Sewing Machine, Washington DC: Smithonian Institution 
Disk/Trend:  Disk/Trend Report 
DM: Dealerscope Merchandising (previous names: Merchandising, Merchandising Week) 
EMDB: Electronic Market Data Book 
Filson: Professor Darren Filson, personal communication 
Golder: Professor Peter Golder, personal communication  
Grinder: Grinder, R. (1995), The Radio Collector’s Directory and Price Guide, Chandler, AZ: Sonoran Publishing 
IDC: International Data Corporation, Processor Installation Census 
ITC: US International Trade Commission, Synthetic Organic Chemicals: Production and Sales 
ITI: Information Technology Industry Data Book 
LNA: Leading National Advertisers, LNA/BAR Class/Brand YTD $ 
MVMA:  Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of US, Motor Vehicle Facts & Figures 
Predicasts: Predicasts Basebook 
Smith: Smith, P. (1968), Wheels Within Wheels, NY: Funk and Wagnalls 
TR: Thomas Register of American Manufacturers 
WIMA: Writing Instruments Manufacturers Association, Mechanical Handwriting Instruments Industry   26
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